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I Articles I
Campbell v. Clinton and the Continuing
Effort to Reassert Congress'
Predominant Constitutional Authority to
Commence, or Prevent, War
Ronald J. Sievert*
The President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy
of the United States. In this respect his authority would be
nominally the same as that of the king of Great Britain, but in
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy;
while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and
to the raising and regulating of the fleets and armies; all which by
the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the
legislature.
Alexander Hamilton'
* Adjunct Professor, University of Texas School of Law, U.S. Law and
National Security, Author, Cases and Materials on U.S. Law and National Security
(William S. Hein and Rothman, Scheduled publication date, Oct. 2000), J.D. 1977
University of Texas School of Law; B.A. 1970 St. Bonaventure University.
THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE REPRESENTS THE OPINIONS OF THE
AUTHOR AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE POSITION OF
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One of the most fascinating aspects of American legal history
in the last thirty years has been the conflict between Congress and
the President over exercise of the war power. Frequently, the
related surface spectacle, in which members of congress struggle to
determine what position to take during a pending military conflict,
has perhaps been even more interesting. Before taking a clear
stand before their constituents, these congressmen want to wait in
order to know in advance the answers to three fundamental
questions: will we win, how many casualties will there be, and how
long will it take? The President, of course, often has no such luxury
before action is required.
The horrific consequences of war and the very real possibility
that critical decisions will have to be made in the future on a
number of foreign military operations lifts this conflict far beyond
one of mere academic interest. If history provides any guidance, we
can expect that these decisions will not be easy and will involve
equally strong arguments on both sides. The merits of the debates
for and against the Persian Gulf War were reflected by the fact that
on January 12, 1991, after U.S. forces had already been deployed, a
total of 302 congressmen voted for and 230 against authorizing the
President to use force against Iraq pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 678.2 The vote in the House of Representatives
defeating a proposed Senate concurrent resolution authorizing air
and missile strikes against Yugoslavia was 213 to 213.3 The recent
Senate vote against removing U.S. troops from Kosovo was fifty-
three to forty-seven.4 One can easily imagine a similar situation as a
President, over congressional opposition, moves to defend Taiwan
against Chinese missile attacks. Absent peace in the Middle East, it
is also not difficult to foresee the possibility of a future President
feeling obligated to defend Israel in the face of a Congress acting,
or refusing to act, out of fear of retaliation by terrorists using
weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the recent decisions in
Campbell v. Clinton5 and their progeny pertaining to the efforts of
members of Congress to assert control over the power to
commence, or prevent, war are of paramount importance.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT
AGENCY.
1. FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (Cook ed. 1961).
2. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub.
L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
3. S. Con. Res. 21,106th Cong. (1999).
4. See Eric Schmitt, "Senators Refuse to Set a Deadline on Kosovo Troops,"
N.Y. TIMES May 19, 2000 at 1.




Who, under the Constitution, should have the power to
commit the nation to war? It appears certain that the founding
fathers intended that this monumental decision should be made by
Congress, except when the President found it necessary to repel an
attack or suppress insurrection. In the one segment of the debates
on this issue preserved from the Constitutional Convention's
Committee on Drafting, the following notations appear:
Mr. Butler... (stated) he was for vesting the power in the
President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and
will not support war but when the nation will support it.
Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to change (Congress
shall) "make" war to "declare" leaving to the executive
the power to repel sudden attacks.
Mr. Sharman thought ... the executive should be able to
repel and not to commence war.
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion
to empower the executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Mason was against giving the power of war to the
executive because he can not be trusted with it.
6
This brief glimpse into history reveals the seeds of opposing views
which, as Justice Douglas pointed out in Mora v. McNamara7 ,
continued to be voiced from the time of the Civil War to the
Vietnam War.
James Madison and his colleagues, however, prevailed over
Pierce Butler, the aristocratic former British officer and delegate
from South Carolina, by a vote of eight to one.8  Their
recommendations were adopted by the full convention and,
accordingly, Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives to
Congress, not the Chief Executive, the power to declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal, raise and support Armies, provide
and maintain a Navy, make rules for governing the land and naval
forces, provide for calling forth the militia and provide for arming,
organizing and disciplining the militia. The President, on the other
hand, executes the laws passed by Congress and serves as
Commander in Chief of the military. He has a "shared" power with
Congress to be sure, but it is essentially the authority to decide
6. Massachusettes v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31, (1st Cir. 1971) (quoting 2 Farrand
318-319).
7. 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
8. See Laird, 451 F.2d at 32 n.10.
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when, where and how the military should be employed in a conflict
declared by Congress.
The contemporary statements of the framers underscore this
understanding of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We
have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of
war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the
Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to
those who are to pay."9 James Wilson stated his expectation that
the system would guard against the possibility of hostilities being
initiated by one man.' Even Alexander Hamilton, who was well
known as a proponent of executive power, did not hesitate to point
out, as quoted above, that our President, unlike the King of
England, could not on his own command the country to enter a
state of war.
II
How then did we get to the point that in 1972, Congress felt
compelled to pass the War Powers Resolution in an effort to
reclaim what was its right under the Constitution? How, with this
historical background, did we find ourselves in 1999 observing a
President, without explicit authorization, conducting an air war
against a foreign nation involving 800 aircraft, more than 20,000
sorties and resulting in thousands of military and civilian
casualties?" It is beyond the scope of this article to list all of the
executive actions, instances of congressional acquiescence and
judicial opinions which led to this expansion of presidential power,
but there are a few which must be highlighted.
The legislative acts of 1798-1799 authorizing our naval forces
to attack (French) ships on the high seas demonstrated that
Congress was an early and active participant in the undeclared
naval war with France. However, Bas v. Tingy's1 2 subsequent
finding that a state of "imperfect war" may legally exist where the
"popular feeling may not have been ripe for a solemn declaration of
war" 13 created the possibility that future Presidents could conduct
offensive military operations without an explicit congressional
declaration. A few years later, President Jefferson, without the
permission of Congress, dispatched the Navy to the Mediterranean
9. 15 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON 397 (Boyd ed. Princeton 1955).
10. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787 (J. Elliott, 2d. ed. 1836).
11. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
12. 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
13. Id. at 45.
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so as to be in position to take action against the Barbary pirates if
those coastal states then committed hostilities. President Polk in
1846 sent the U.S. Army into the hotly disputed Texas border
territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande, later asking for a
declaration of war against Mexico when the Mexican army
responded with what he claimed to be an attack on American
forces on American soil. President Lincoln did not seek a
declaration of war before ordering the naval blockade and military
invasion of the Confederacy, nor did he obtain congressional
approval before taking such dramatic measures as issuing the
Emancipation Proclamation and suspending habeas corpus. In The
Prize Cases14 which followed, five Supreme Court Justices agreed
with Mr. Justice Grier that during the Civil War an actual "state of
war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse .... and no
name given to it by (the President or Congress) could change the
fact."'5 Justice Nelson represented the minority with his contrary
position that a state of war, which would bring into existence legal
obligations and duties, did not exist unless it was "recognized or
declared by the sovereign power of the State, and which sovereign
power by our Constitution is lodged in the Congress of the United
States."' 6
This trend towards executive power continued with
Cunningham v. Neagle" and In re Debs,' domestic cases that placed
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court upon a theory of presidential
"protective" power not explicitly stated in the Constitution.
Significantly, the court in Neagle cited a publicly applauded
overseas naval mission as a laudatory example of the use of this
protective power." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.20
subsequently enhanced presidential authority to an even greater
degree with its oft-cited dicta that, in the field of foreign affairs, the
President's power was "plenary and exclusive.",21 Volumes have
been written about this decision, but it is enough to say that it has
been relied upon as justification for virtually every foreign military
. 14. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 690 (1863). [Popularly regarded as
The Prize Cases.]
15. Id. at 670.
16. Id. at 690.
17. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
18. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
19. See id. at 64.
20. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
21. Id. at 320.
2001]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
operation authorized solely by the President since the date that it
was published.22
Nevertheless, it can be argued that in many ways these cases
and events merely set the stage for the two most influential factors
in the rapid growth of executive power. These were: 1) the speed
of events in the twentieth century and 2) the constant danger of
imminent confrontation during the Cold War. These factors,
epitomized by the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis,
magnified the perceived need to completely defer to the President
as the nation's protector in dealing with serious threats posed by
foreign nations. This atmosphere, with its underlying reliance upon
"superior" presidential knowledge and authority, persisted until the
Vietnam War.
III
It was not well known in 1964 that the American destroyers
attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese patrol boats
were actually present as apparent covering forces during
commando raids against North Vietnam. The President expressed
outrage over North Vietnam's "provocation" and the Congress
subsequently passed the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
stating that "these attacks [were] part of a deliberate and systemic
campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North
Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors . . . [accordingly]
[t]he Congress approves and supports the determination of the
President ... to take all necessary measures ... to prevent further
aggression. 23 Relying on this provision, the SEATO defense treaty
and the continuous appropriations by Congress, President Johnson
waged an ever-expanding war in Vietnam until the Tet offensive led
to his decision not to run for reelection. President Nixon's policy of
"peace with honor" and "Vietnamization" did not bring the war to
an early conclusion. As a result, the courts were increasingly
confronted with lawsuits brought by soldiers who had obtained
standing because they had been ordered to Vietnam. The principle
thrust of their arguments was that the Executive was forcing them
to participate in a war not properly authorized by Congress by
means of a declaration as envisioned by the Constitution.
22. See Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of
Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999); HAROLD HONJU KOH, NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION, (1990); Harold Honju Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran Contra-Affair, 97 YALE L. J.
1255, 1306-10, 1313, 1335, 1337 (1988).
23. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, House Pub. L. No.88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
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The series of cases challenging the legality of the Vietnam War
put the courts squarely in the middle of the "impenetrable thicket,
24
of the political question doctrine formulated by Baker v. Carr.25
That is, in deciding in the first instance whether the matter
submitted was justiciable, the courts had to determine if 1) there
was a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to another
branch of government; 2) there was a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for reviewing it; 3) the matter involved a
policy question beyond judicial discretion; and 4) the matter in-
volved the potential for embarrassment resulting from competing
pronouncements from different branches and or the need to respect
the decisions of separate branches.26
Although differing in their rationales, virtually all the courts
confronted with these efforts to halt the war "'shied away' on
'political question' grounds., 27 Orlando v. Laird28 and Massachu-
setts v. Laird.29 are characteristic of these decisions. In the former
opinion, the Second Circuit found that based on the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution and military appropriations, Congress was clearly acting
in mutual participation with the President in the prosecution of the
war.' Whether there must be an official legislative declaration of
war was a matter "determined by highly complex considerations of
diplomacy, foreign policy and military strategy inappropriate to
judicial inquiry., 31  The First Circuit in Massachusetts v. Laird
concluded that the question of whether there should be a
declaration of war had been textually committed to other branches
by the Constitution. 2 The fact that there had been no formal
declaration did not mean that there was a congressional
disagreement with administration policy.33 On the contrary, the
evidence demonstrated legislative support.34 Accordingly, the court
held that "the Constitution, in giving some essential powers to
congress and others to the executive, committed the matter to both
24. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1971).
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. See id. at 217.
27. Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 550 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
28. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
30. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042.
31. Id. at 1043.
32. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 32-33.




branches, whose joint concord precludes the judiciary from
measuring a specific executive action ....
Significantly, after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was
terminated by Congress effective January 2, 1971, the D.C. Circuit
in Mitchell v. Laird36 found that President Nixon's duty was now to
try "in good faith and to the best of his ability, to bring the war to
an end as promptly as was consistent with the safety of those
fighting and with a profound concern for the durable interests of
the nation-its defense, its honor, its morality., 37  Whether
President Nixon was so proceeding, however, was a question
"which at this stage in history a court is incompetent to answer., 38
Even so, four Judges dissented from the majority's opinion, stating
that regardless of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, "the
appropriations ... indicate Congress' continuing assent to the
prosecution of the war.,
39
During and after the war, the popular wisdom was that the
conflict was solely "Johnson's war" or "Nixon's war," a misper-
ception that was encouraged by many in the legislature as it became
obvious that the war was not being won. It naturally followed from
this logic that the solution to prevent future executive debacles
would be a measure which would help reestablish the war power in
the hands of the Congress where it originally had been placed by
the Constitutional Convention of 1789. The result was the War
Powers Act of 1973.40 The very first provision of this legislation
made it clear that Congress was attempting to take a historical
stand on solid constitutional grounds after 183 years of expanding
executive power. Section 1541 of the War Powers Act stated that:
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities...
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
.. are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
35. Id. at 33.
36. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 616.
38. Id. at 616.
39. Id. at 617.
40. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1999)).
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specific statutory authorization or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces."
The act went on to provide that, in the absence of a declaration
of war, the President must submit a written report to the Speaker of
the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate within forty-
eight hours of introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly
indicated. 2  The report would set forth the circumstances
necessitating the introduction of forces, the estimated scope and
duration of hostilities, and the constitutional and legislative
authority under which the introduction took place.43 If Congress
was physically able to meet and had not granted an extension, the
President must terminate any use of force within sixty days of the
due date of the first report unless Congress had declared war or
specifically authorized the use of force." At any time that U.S.
Armed Forces were involved in hostilities outside the territory of
the United States without a declaration of war or specific
authorizing statute, the President must remove the forces if
Congress so directed by means of a concurrent resolution.45
With an understanding of the legal debates over implied
powers during the Vietnam War, Congress further provided that
authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces could not be inferred
from any appropriations act or any treaty unless they contained
provisions specifically authorizing force within the meaning of the
War Powers Resolution (WRP).'  Furthermore, to prevent the
fiction of "advisors only," and the "mission creep" that sometimes
came with the true deployment of advisors, the statute provided
that "for purposes of this chapter, the term 'introduction of U.S.
Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed
forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or
accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign
country or government when such forces are engaged ... in
hostilities."47
President Nixon and legal scholars who had observed the
development of an inherent presidential war power, as well as
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(3).
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).
47. 50 U.S.C § 1547(c).
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"protective" and "plenary and exclusive" authority in foreign
affairs, immediately questioned the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution. 8 President Nixon also had concerns related to
the fact that the resolution would require that the use of force be
terminated without a vote, or after a vote by concurrent resolution
which would require no presentment to the executive for signature
or veto. Accordingly, he sent a veto message to Congress stating in
part,
In effect the Congress is here attempting to increase its policy-
making role through a provision which requires it take no action
at all. In my view, the proper way for Congress to make known
its will on such foreign policy questions is through a positive
action with full debates on the merits of the issue and with each
member taking the responsibility of casting a yes or no vote
after considering those merits.
49
In addition, the resolution would "eliminate certain authorities
merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution-an action which
does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the
President his constitutional role in approving legislation."5 This
latter point, of course, received substantial support with the
Supreme Court's decision ten years later in INS v. Chadha5" calling
12into question all "legislative veto" provisions.
The political climate was not conducive to acceptance of the
President's arguments. Stung by what was perceived as Nixon's
expansion of the war in 1970 by invading Cambodia, increasingly
distrustful as news of the Watergate burglary and likely executive
cover up became public, and ready to reclaim its authority,
Congress overrode the Presidential veto and the War Powers
Resolution became law.
IV.
Those who thought the War Powers Resolution might be a
panacea that would halt military adventurism and permit Congress
to resume control over foreign affairs were soon disappointed.
48. See, eg., arguments for and against the War Powers Resolution in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (John Norton Moore, et al. eds., 1990).
49. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res.
542 Without His Approval, R. Nixon, Pub. Papers, 893, 894-95 (Oct. 24, 1973).
50. Id. at 893.
51. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
52. See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L. J. 785
(1984) and Thomas Franck and Clifford Bob, The Return of Humpty Dumpty,
Foreign Relations Law After the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1985).
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During President Reagan's term in office he dispatched advisors to
El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, invaded Grenada, and sent
the U.S. Navy into hostile waters in the Persian Gulf in the "Tanker
War" without once obtaining explicit authorization from Congress.
When small groups of Congressmen appealed to the courts on the
grounds that the War Powers Resolution had been ignored, they
found that the judiciary refused to come to their assistance.
The courts relied on a number of theories to avoid making a
decision on the merits. Dominant among them was the position
expressed by Justice Powell in Goldwater v. Carter53 while con-
curring in the dismissal of a suit brought by twenty-four members of
Congress who had attempted to prevent President Carter's
abrogation of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Powell
reasoned that the Treaty case should not proceed because a
majority of the Senate or House had not specifically rejected the
President's claim: "If the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so."" The same was true with
challenges by a few members of Congress to President Reagan's
actions in El Salvador,55 Nicaragua16 and the Persian Gulf. 7 The
D.C. Circuit also employed the related doctrine of equitable or
remedial discretion in response to congressional complaints that the
administration had acted illegally in Nicaragua58 and Grenada. 9
Under this doctrine, the courts stated that they would not exercise
jurisdiction where Congress had institutional remedies available if
they could obtain the votes, such as appropriations legislation and
impeachment. Finally, some of the opinions continued to assert
under Baker v. Carr that the courts lacked judicial resources or
manageable standards to resolve disputed issues of fact such as
whether war or hostilities existed.60
The failure of the courts to take action when a few legislators
banded together to try to reverse administration policy did not
mean, however, that the WPR had no effect on the congressional-
executive relationship. This was demonstrated when Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait and the first large-scale military action
since passage of the WPR appeared imminent. Although President
53. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
54. Id. at 997-998.
55. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
56. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
57. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
58. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 202.
59. Conyers v. Reagan 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984).
60. See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 333; Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1355.
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Bush continuously maintained that he had independent authority to
initiate military action in the Persian Gulf War, a review of
statements and events after the fact demonstrates the impact of the
WPR.6  On August 9, 1990, President Bush informed congressional
leaders "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution that he was
deploying troops to the Gulf to "deter Iraqi aggression and
preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia., 62 After President Bush
made the decision to increase the size of the force in order to
prepare for offensive action to drive the Iraqi's out of Kuwait, he
conveyed his position on November 14, 1999 to a special bi-partisan
Congressional commission that had been set up to monitor events. 63
The President stated at a press conference on December 2, 1990
that he had not continuously talked to Congress: "I cannot consult
with 535 strong willed individuals. I can't do it, nor does my
responsibility under the Constitution compel me to do that." But
when the beginning of hostilities loomed the following month, he
sent a letter to Congress on January 8, 1991 asking for their
support.' Congress responded on January 12, 1991 with a
resolution authorizing the use of force to implement UN
Resolution 678 stating that it was to be construed as "specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5 of the War
Powers Act."'65
The President, thus, did make efforts to consult with
congressional leaders, Congress took active steps to remain
engaged in the decision process, and in the end President Bush
sought congressional support for military action. As Represent-
ative David Bonior stated, "[T]he WPR was an important vehicle
for us to exercise our constitutional mandate ... It gave us a way to
jump in to a defense of our congressional responsibilities." 66 In an
interview after the war, Representative Dante Fascell stated,
The President kept saying in meetings that he could go it alone.
But many of us kept telling him that he couldn't, that he needed
the support of the American people and the Congress. If the
WPR wasn't there, he might have taken the bit in his mouth a la
61. Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution:
Congress and the Persian Gulf War, 21 J. LEGIs. 23 (1995).
62. Id. at 261 (quoting letter to the Speaker of the House and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to
Saudi Arabis and the Middle East, 26 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1125-26 (Aug. 9,
1990)).
63. See id. at 27.
64. See id. at 28.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Burgin, supra note 61 at 40.
[Vo1.105:2
CAMPBELL V. CLINTON
Johnson and gone on his own ... The fact that we had a
dialogue between the President and Congress here, and (we)
kept telling him this, was important."
Another potentially encouraging development during the
pendency of the Gulf War for those who would seek to curb
presidential power was the court's decision in Dellums v. Bush. 
6
On November 20, 1990, fifty-four congressmen had filed suit under
the Constitution seeking an injunction to prevent military action
without congressional authorization.69 Perhaps because of internal
debate as to whether the forces then present in the Gulf were in
imminent danger of hostilities, the plaintiffs did not stake their
claim on the WPR in addition to the Constitution. The court's
decision on December 13, 1990 was nevertheless instructive and
potentially useful for those who would seek judicial intervention at
a later date. In his opinion, Judge Greene in rapid sequence
disposed of many of the arguments that had kept courts from acting
in previous cases. He declined to hold that members of Congress
did not have standing to bring the lawsuit even though military
action had not yet been taken.' The case involved votes on matters
which should be entrusted to their respective chambers, and, if
Congress waited until the President commenced war, the meaning
of a Congressional vote would be lost.7 He further stated that the
question whether forces were involved in war or hostilities was not
a "political question" which the courts were incapable of answering,
especially when the forces involved were of great magnitude and
significance." Finally, he refused to invoke the doctrine of remedial
discretion, stating:
The 'remedies' of cutting off funding to the military or
impeaching the President are not available to these plaintiffs,
either politically or practically. Additionally, these 'remedies'
would not afford the relief sought by the plaintiffs -which is the
guarantee that they will have the opportunity to debate and vote
on the wisdom of initiating a military attack against Iraq before
the United States military becomes embroiled in belligerency
with that nation.73
67. Id. at 42.
68. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C 1990).
69. See id. at 1143.
70. See id. at 1147-48.
71. Id. at 1147.
72. Id. at 1145.
73. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149.
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In this particular case, however, in accordance with Justice
Powell's reasoning in Goldwater v. Carter, as only a minority of
members had brought the suit, the judge thought it unwise to take
action: "[T]he President is entitled to be protected from an
injunctive order regarding a declaration of war when there is no
evidence that this is what the Legislative branch as such-as
distinguished from a fraction thereof-regards as a necessary
prerequisite to military moves in the Arabian desert."74  If a
majority of members brought the case at a time when the President
was clearly committed to war, however, the plaintiffs motion for an
injunction would be seriously considered.75
V.
On March 24, 1999, after Serbian atrocities in Kosovo and the
refusal of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia (FRY) to agree to
a peace settlement proposed by the United Nations, NATO forces
led by the United States commenced an air war against Yugoslavia.
On March 26, 1999, the President reported to Congress, consistent
with the WPR, that he had taken this action, "pursuant to my
constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as
Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.,16 In a series of votes
on April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives: 1) defeated by a
vote of 427 to 2 a joint resolution calling for the declaration of a
state of war between the U.S. and Yugoslavia;7 7 2) defeated by a
vote of 290 to 139 a concurrent resolution that would have directed
the President pursuant to the WPR to remove U.S. forces from
their present positions in connection with operations against the
FRY;78 and 3) rejected by a vote of 213 to 213 a concurrent
resolution that had been earlier passed by the Senate authorizing
the President to conduct air and missile operations against the
FRY.79 On May 21, 1999, Congress passed an Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Act that provided emergency appro-
priations for the conflict in Yugoslavia."
On April 30, 1999, Congressman Tom Campbell and twenty-
five other Representatives filed a lawsuit to compel the President to
obtain congressional authorization to continue the war. The suit
74. Id. at 1151.
75. See id. at 1152.
76. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp.2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 1999).
77. H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).
78. H.R. Con. Res. 82.
79. S. Con. Res. 21.
80. Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57.
[Vo1.105:2
CAMPBELL V. CLINTON
claimed that the President was acting in violation of the
Constitution by not seeking a declaration of war and that, pursuant
to the War Powers Resolution, he must terminate all hostilities
within 60 days of March 26, 1999 absent specific congressional
authorization to continue."' As the plaintiffs in Dellums did not rely
on the WPR, this was arguably "the first truly significant invocation
of that law to restrict a presidential war-making initiative."8 2 The
Justice Department claimed in response that the suit was asking for
adjudication of a political question and that the matter was not ripe
for review as decided by the court in Dellums."3 The government
also stated that, based on the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Raines v. Byrd,' plaintiffs did not have standing because they had
not demonstrated personal injury traceable to the defendant's
allegedly illegal conduct which was likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.85
Raines v. Byrd involved a suit brought by a minority group of
Congressmen challenging the Line Item Veto Act.86 They alleged
that this Act, by permitting the President to strike particular items
from bills that had been passed by both houses, in effect diluted
their voting power under Article I of the Constitution." The
Supreme Court found that their claim was not one of individual
personal injury, but of institutional injury and lack of political
power.' The Court held that individual members in this type of
case did not have a sufficient personal stake in a case or controversy
to establish standing.' The Court further noted that the standing
requirement was especially rigorous in any case that would require
the Court to decide the Constitutionality of an act of one branch of
government.9° It was noted in passing that some importance was
attached to the fact that the plaintiffs in the case were a minority
who had not been authorized to represent their respective
chambers.9
81. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1994).
82. Maj. Geoffrey S. Corn, Campbell v. Clinton: The "Implied Consent"
Theory of Presidential War Power is Again Validated, 161 MIL. L. REV 202, 205
(1999). This article pertains only to the District Court's opinion.
83. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp.2d at 40.
84. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
85. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41.
86. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 813.
87. See id. at 816.
88. See id. at 821.
89. See id. at 826.
90. See id. at 819.
91. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
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The Court in Raines did, however, allow that institutional
standing could be established in certain cases of complete
nullification of a legislative act.92 Relying on Coleman v. Miller,93a
case where a state Lt. Governor's vote had defeated legislation
which had been passed, the Court acknowledged that, in a similar
situation where the legislature's will had been ignored and there
was no further recourse, the case might be allowed to proceed.94
On June 8, 1999, U.S. District Court Judge Paul Friedman
granted the President's motion to dismiss in Campbell v. Clinton.
He held that, after Raines, all previous discussions of ripeness and
remedial discretion were subsumed in the standing analysis
required by that case.95 The courts should not umpire general
disputes between the executive and legislative branches with regard
to the scope of their powers.96 Complaints that the President had
ignored the WPR, therefore, were not enough. Rather, Congress
must have exercised authority and the President must have acted to
nullify a clear direction from Congress.' Only then would there be
a true constitutional impasse or actual confrontation that would
give the legislature standing.98 In this case, the different votes of
Congress had sent "distinctly mixed messages.'' 99 The lack of a con-
sistent majority vote against the President, and the small number of
Representatives bringing the lawsuit, meant that standing had not
been established.1°
The court went on to state, however, that it did not consider
the appropriations bill that had been passed as authorization within
the meaning of the WPR."' Furthermore, if standing was
established, the President should not assume that the court would
treat the war powers issue as a non-justiciable political question., °
The court also volunteered that it did not believe the availability of
legislative alternatives such as impeachment would be sufficient to
defeat standing if the President had acted to nullify a clear direction
from Congress."
92. See id. at 823.
93. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
94. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
95. Campbell 52 F. Supp.2d at 40.
96. See id at 41.
97. See id. at 42.
98. See id. at 43.
99. Id. at 44.
100. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
101. See id. at 44, n.9.
102. See id. at 40, n.5.
103. See id. at 45, n.ll.
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The conflict in Yugoslavia officially ended on June 21, 1999
when NATO announced the termination of the air campaign and
Defense Secretary Cohen began redeployment of U.S. aircraft back
to their home bases. The D.C. Circuit, nevertheless, accepted the
original case for review and on February 18, 2000 a three judge
panel issued its opinion.1" The appellate court appeared to
acknowledge that the matter was technically moot and need not be
decided because the exact same circumstances would probably not
reoccur and the issues did not inherently evade judicial scrutiny. 105
But, instead of relying on mootness, the court chose to issue a
twenty one page opinion in which it affirmed the lower court based
on lack of legislative standing pursuant to Raines v. Byrd.
The reasoning of the appellate court was, however, sharply
divided. Judges Silberman and Tatel held that "complete
nullification" only occurred when Congress had no further
recourse.1" As Congress could pass a law forbidding the use of the
Air Force in Yugoslavia, cut off funds for military operations, or
impeach the President, its ability to act had not been completely
nullified. Judge Randolph completely rejected this interpretation
of nullification, holding that it applies any time a legislative bill that
has been passed is ignored by the executive or that has been
defeated actually goes into effect."° Here, although military forces
were being utilized, "War was not declared and the President never
maintained that he was prosecuting the war with the approval of
the House."' "[The President did not] exercise statutory authority
reserved to him only when Congress has declared a war, and their
votes against declaring war can not be considered a nullity.' 1°9
Accordingly, there was no standing in this particular case with
respect to a specific vote.'10 However, if such nullification had been
achieved, then standing would be established and it would not be
sufficient to defeat standing to maintain that appropriations could
later be cut or the President impeached."'
104. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
105. See id. at 32.
106. See id. at 22-23.
107. See id. at 29.
108. Id. at 29.
109. Campbell, 203 F.3d. at 33.
110. See id. The nullification required to establish standing by a member of
Congress apparently would have to be a nullification of a current vote. It would
not be sufficient to state simply that the President "ignored the War Powers
Resolution and hence the votes of an earlier Congress." Id.
111. See id. at 32.
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Judge Randolph agreed with District Judge Friedman as to the
lack of importance that should be attached to congressional
appropriations in general as evidence of true legislative intent or as
a vehicle to express congressional will. During the Vietnam War, a
Department of Defense budget intended by some members to
protect against the worldwide Soviet menace was sometimes
interpreted as specific authorization for the war in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, even when funds were specifically designated for the
combat zone, this did not necessarily constitute approval of military
intervention in that particular area. Rather, "'As every schoolboy
knows,' Congress may pass such legislation not because it is in favor
of continuing the hostilities but because it does want to endanger
soldiers in the field. The War Powers Resolution itself makes the
same point" by stating that authority to introduce forces into
hostilities should not be implied from any appropriations act.112
The appellate judges also came to different conclusions as to
whether or not the issue was justiciable. Judge Silberman stated
that the threshold question under the WPR of whether U.S. forces
are engaged in hostilities "is not precise enough and too obviously
calls for a political judgment to be one suitable for judicial
determinations., 113 Judge Tatel strongly disagreed. He stated that
determining the existence of hostilities or war was no more difficult
than determining what police conduct violated the constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. Relying on
Bas v. Tingy, the Prize cases, Mitchell v. Laird and Dellums, he
noted that the court had often made findings as to whether a state
of war existed:
If in 1799 the Supreme Court could recognize that sporadic
battles between American and French vessels amounted to a
state of war, then surely we, looking to similar evidence, could
determine whether months of daily air strikes involving 800 U.S.
aircraft flying more than 20,000 sorties and causing thousands of
enemy casualties amounted to war within the meaning of Article
I, section 8, clause 11 [of the Constitution].1 4
Furthermore, under the WPR, the court "would need to ask only
whether, and at what time, U.S. forces were introduced into
hostilities. 115
112. Id. at 31, n.10.
113. Id. at 25.




The court was thus unanimous in deciding that standing had
not been achieved in this case, but divided as to exactly what
congressional actions were necessary before it could be established.
The three appellate judges also took strong, but often contra-
dictory, stands on related issues of justiciability and the meaning of
appropriations, which had been debated in the past and are likely to
be considered significant in the future.
VI.
An examination of Clinton v. Campbell and the previously
cited decisions clearly demonstrates that Baker v. Carr, Goldwater
v. Carter and now Raines v. Byrd have presented major obstacles to
any attempt to secure the effective intercession of the judiciary in
disputes over the executive exercise of the war power. As noted
earlier, Congress' efforts to reestablish authority with the War
Powers Resolution had been weakened in part by Chadha's threat
to the legislative veto as contained in 50 U.S.C 1544(c)'s require-
ment that forces be removed if Congress so directed by a
concurrent resolution. If 50 U.S.C 1544(b), pertaining to the term-
ination of force within sixty days in the absence of express
congressional authorization, had any viability in light of Justice
Powell's opinion in Goldwater and the decision in Dellums v. Bush,
it would appear that this provision has now been completely
negated by the need for a specific affirmative majority vote
demanded by Raines and Campbell. It was, thus, no accident that
Justice Randolph took the unusual step of printing in its entirety
President Nixon's veto message seriously questioning these two
aspects of the WPR as an appendix to his decision in Campbell.
We could be left then with the continued operation of the
doctrine of "implied congressional consent" to presidential war-
making which was expressed in the Laird cases and has extended
through the campaign against Yugoslavia. Referring to the intro-
duction of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Iraq immediately before the
Serbian conflict, Charles Tiefer noted that, "Today's war actions
receive funding from appropriations in which an ambivalent
Congress neither expressly authorizes nor expressly cuts off funding
for particular interventions."'' 6 These constitute what in essence
can be termed "partial declarations of war" which are sanctioned by
116. See Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Later 1990's by Partial
Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 5 (1999); WILLIAM C. BANKS




"legitimizing appropriations. '"7  This may be the only way to
proceed with a Congress whose members, for obvious political
reasons, are reluctant to publicly commit in the early stages of
military action. It would certainly conform with Justice Jackson's
acknowledgment of executive power when acting without specific
congressional authorization or disapproval in an area of concurrent
authority. 18
In the author's opinion however, a close review of the
decisions in Dellums, Raines and Campbell actually provides some
hope for any Congress ready to take a stand in defense of its
constitutional authority to control the war power. As related in this
article, Judge Greene in Dellums and Judges Friedman and Tatel in
Campbell made it clear that they believed the courts, in many
circumstances, could determine whether war or hostilities existed.
They would not seek the shelter of the political question doctrine
on this issue unless the situation was ambiguous. Furthermore,
Judge Greene, Judge Friedman and Judge Randolph refused to
regard appropriations as determinative and pointedly rejected the
related remedial discretion doctrine that would always defer
judicial action as long as Congress could impeach the President.
It is also interesting to note that, despite the positions of
Presidents Nixon and Bush and President Clinton's announcement
of the use of force in Yugoslavia "pursuant to my constituational
authority to conduct foreign relation and as Commander in Chief,"
the Clinton administration did not claim "inherent" power to
conduct the bombing campaign in its response to plaintiff's claims
in Campbell v. Clinton."9 This, hopefully, may be an indication that
the WPR and decisions such as Dellums v. Bush have convinced the
executive that it is no longer proper to act as if presidential power
in foreign affairs was "plenary and exclusive."
In addition, "counsel for the President (in Campbell) appears
to have acknowledged that an individual alleging personal injury
from the President's alleged failure to comply with the War Powers
clause or the War Powers Resolutions, as for example, a service
person who has been sent to carry out the air strikes .... would
have standing to raise these claims."'2 ° It is true that such a
requirement not only places an undue burden on those in the
military sworn to obey orders, but that it takes time when delay is
117. Tiefer, supra note 116 at 5..
118. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 637 (1952).
119. Corn, supra note 82.
120. Campbell, 52 F. Supp.2d at 43, n.8.
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not always the best course in cases involving the imminent outbreak
of hostilities. Nevertheless, as Justice Souter said in Raines, there is
sometimes a "virtue in waiting" for a private suit "after the politics
have at least subsided from a full boil."'' 2' This concession by the
executive, although supported by precedent, 22 should be welcome
as at least removing a possible roadblock to bringing war powers
questions to the courts, even if individual suit is not always the ideal
or most timely instrument.
Finally, and more importantly, a Congress ready to take
responsibility on its own without undue delay should recognize in
Dellums v. Bush, Raines v. Byrd and the opinions in Campbell v.
Clinton, an opening for the reassertion of power at any point in a
crisis as long as they are ready to explicitly act by a majority vote.
In the Vietnam War cases, the courts would often cite prior
congressional appropriations and the Selective Service Act as an
indication of congressional will. This persisted even when the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution had been withdrawn. Under Raines,
however, any specific congressional act ignored by the President
could potentially create an immediate nullification issue despite
prior legislation that indicated support for administration policy. A
number of judges in these cases indicated that they would not
always hide behind the political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr
or the doctrine of remedial discretion. Executive nullification
could, under Raines and Campbell, provide a critical issue upon
which judges must now rule.
Of course, what exactly constitutes "nullification" will continue
to be a subject for debate. It could be argued that Clinton's
continued use of force after sixty days was a direct violation of the
WPR and therefore a nullification of existing legislation. Judge
Randolph, a proponent of single act nullification, rejected this
interpretation, however, in part because the statute had been
passed by a former Congress.'23 On the other extreme, the
executive would probably maintain that nullification would only
occur if a two thirds majority of Congress had overriden a
presidential veto and the President had continued to act contrary to
a specific congressional prohibition. If Chadha does in fact
preclude the use of the simple majority legislative veto as set forth
in 1544(c), this position could prevail. But Judge Randolph
121. Raines, 521 U.S. at 835.
122. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusettes v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
123. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31.
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indicated that nullification could be created when a majority of
Congress passed or declined to pass a relevant proposal and the
President completely ignored the vote. Specifically, if the President
had assumed control of transportation systems or condemned land
as authorized in time of war, or "invaded Yugoslavia by land" in
opposition to the express purpose of a legislative vote, he would
have nullified congressional action and created standing. 124 In light
of these disparate views, it can be anticipated that "nullification"
will be the key strategic point in the next legal battle to limit the
war power that has been assumed by the President.
VII.
Characterizing the President's military power in Youngstown
Steel almost fifty years before President Clinton's attack on
Yugoslavia, Justice Jackson wrote these prophetic words:
(The) loose appellation (of Commander in Chief) is sometimes
advanced as support for any Presidential action, internal or
external, involving use of force, the idea being that it vests
power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army
or navy.
No penance would ever expiate the sin against free government
of holding that a President can escape control of executive
121powers by law through assuming his military role.
It was in this spirit that Congress passed the War Powers Act in
1973. In an interview on May 17, 2000, Senate majority leader
Trent Lott publicly stated that he and his colleagues continued to
firmly advocate adherence to the principles of this legislation. 26 It
is, of course, encouraging that a leading member of Congress
maintains support for this historical effort to reassert control over
the war power. But the entire Congress must recognize and have
the courage to accept that it was the intent of the founding fathers
that they, not the President, decide when to initiate offensive war.'
27
124. Id. at 31-32 and nn.8 and 9.
125. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642, 646.
126. Trent Lott, Interview on Hardball with Chris Matthews, (CNBC television
broadcast, May 17, 2000).
127. Those who would like to see the courts and the Congress take a more
active role have proposed a number of solutions to revitalize the process.
Congress could more explicitly define "war," "hostilities," and "imminent
hostilities" for courts that have claimed they had no manageable standards to
make a determination regarding the existence of these states of conflict. Brian H.
Spaid, Collective Security v. Constitutional Sovereignty: Can the President Commit
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Congress' abdication of authority for reasons of politics and
expediency has created the danger that the framers sought to
prevent; that one man could bring the country into an unjustified
and catastrophic war. The air war over Yugoslavia presented the
country with another example of congressional vacillation and
"mixed" legislative messages. But Dellums v. Bush, Raines v. Byrd
and Campbell v. Clinton indicate that if Congress can take an
explicit stand on a specific exercise of the war power, they are likely
to find that the courts will enforce their will.
Troops Under the Sanction of the United Nations Security Council Without
Congressional Approval, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1055 (1992). Congress could
attempt to "legislate away the jurisdictional shields (noted above) by which the
courts have insulated themselves from the war powers process." Peter J. Spiro,
Review: of War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism by John Hart Ely, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1338 (1993) (reviewing John Hart Ely, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)). The courts,
for example, could be directed to make a finding on whether or not hostilities were
imminent and then remand the case to Congress for approval or disapproval. See
id. The problem, as Professor Koh has stated, is that "Congress can not legislate
judicial courage any more than it can legislate executive self-restraint or
congressional willpower." HAROLD HONJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION 181 (1990). The political question, ripeness and nullification
doctrines developed by the courts will not be easy to overcome absent the impetus
provided by a majority vote in Congress.
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